Practitioner's perspective: how will pay cuts impact policing and crime?

There are perhaps two issues here, and I simplify because you could write a dissertation on each. The first is the impact of cuts on the number of officers and staff — the capability to deliver. The second is the impact on the motivation of those who remain but have their pay cut.

On the first point: published data suggests investment in policing has increased over the years, reaching record officer numbers — but productivity, measured in various ways, has not correlated. Why? The issue lies not in numbers but in what those staff actually do. In my experience, increased numbers do not correlate with better productivity. What matters is the quality of staff, the leadership they receive and what they are directed to do.

This last point is the crux. Over the past decade, policing has been heavily focused on visibility and the 'confidence agenda'. Many officers walk the streets in high-visibility jackets to reassure the public, when much research suggests this does little to reduce crime or catch offenders. A small crime squad of capable officers using local intelligence effectively to target core criminals will be more effective and cheaper. The problem is that anti-social behaviour is a government priority, and visibility is seen as much of the answer — when in fact anti-social behaviour is fundamentally a societal issue that policing can only partially address. People and politicians want to see officers on the street. They are not interested in officers in plain clothes doing intelligence work.

My point is this: cuts to policing can be absorbed up to a certain level without affecting our ability to tackle crime — so long as you believe that intelligence-led policing delivers results, which it does. We need a certain size of force to deliver basic response and investigative services. Beyond that minimum, what matters is what you do with the officers you have.

The bigger question is this: what do we actually want our police to do? I believe we could do so much better if we could collaborate forces more effectively, build greater national alignment on priorities, remove poor performers, focus on what works, and value good management and leadership. You could have a huge police force with all the existing problems and achieve little. Or you could reduce numbers, address those structural problems, and have a far better police force.

The risk right now is that we are not reforming policing; we are simply making the same thing smaller. That may force a useful re-evaluation of where resources go — away from street-wandering and neighbourhood tea parties and towards serious crime investigation. But it will only improve outcomes if it is accompanied by real structural change, not just budget reduction.

On pay: the argument that pay directly drives performance is complex and contested. The Winsor review makes reasonable points about rewarding higher-skilled officers and those working unsociable hours. Do officers do dangerous jobs because of the money? No. But concerns about pensions and job security — particularly for police staff, who can be made redundant while officers cannot — are causing a morale dip, and some are considering their options.

The review does not address the fundamental problems: the 'job for life' culture, the difficulty of rewarding the best performers or removing the poor ones. Until we do this, the police will continue to carry a cohort of people who do not deliver — which is an insult to those who do outstanding work.

In summary: what matters most is what you do with the officers you have. Reducing police numbers does not necessarily lead to more crime — but only if core functions are properly covered and if the reduction is accompanied by genuine reform. At the moment, we are getting the cuts without the reform.