A question of economic or strategic necessity?

The Thatcher government replaced Polaris with Trident. Just before that decision was taken, the Commons defence select committee announced it would hold an inquiry into strategic nuclear weapons policy. Political anxiety followed.

According to recently released archives, the Defence Secretary, Francis Pym, suggested he 'play it long' by not providing all the evidence to the committee until the government had taken its decision, a course endorsed by Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong: 'It should not be too difficult to string the committee along… It will be important to maintain the committee's goodwill in order to do everything possible to ensure a favourable reception of the public announcement in the House when it comes.' Thatcher's response: 'Yes — but the committee will be very angry when they learn about the decision.'

Shortly afterwards, Pym underlined to Parliament that defence 'has the capability of creating jobs and employment' — a point proved right, with Trident creating 13,000 jobs in Barrow alone by the 1990s.

Was this a strategic defence decision with economic benefits as a bonus, or was economics the real driver dressed up in the language of strategy? The Coalition, in almost the opposite position, announced it would delay Trident replacement on economic grounds — to make cost savings. It seems that most governments, since the first British nuclear weapons, have declared that nuclear strategy is dictated purely by strategic need — yet the evidence consistently points towards more practical economic rationale.